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T

he U.S. Supreme Court handed down its ruling in
the inal trademark case of the 2019–20 term in U.S.
Patent & Trademark Ofice v. Booking.com B.V.1 on
June 30, 2020. In an 8–1 decision authored by Justice
Ginsburg, the majority held that consumer perception
alone should determine whether terms are registrable
as trademarks or generic and free for all to use.
The issue was whether a term that is generic for the class of
goods or services can be protected as a trademark when followed
by “.com.” The U.S. Patent and Trademark Ofice (USPTO)
refused to register BOOKING.COM in four related applications for travel reservation services, inding that “booking” was
generic for these services and that the addition of the generic
top-level domain (gTLD) “.com” failed to cure the problem as
a matter of law. After unsuccessfully appealing the trademark
examining attorney’s refusal in the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, the applicant sued the Director of the USPTO in district
court, likely as a means to escape unfavorable Federal Circuit
precedent, where an appeal could have been made. The district
court, hearing the case de novo and declaring it a case of irst
impression in the Fourth Circuit, ruled that a generic term plus a
gTLD creates a merely descriptive mark and that Booking.com
had acquired secondary meaning. The inding that the mark was
descriptive with acquired distinctiveness, but not the per se rule,
was afirmed by the Fourth Circuit.2
At the Supreme Court, Booking.com did not contest that
“booking” is generic for the services it offers, and the USPTO
did not contest the secondary meaning evidence proffered by
Booking.com showing that consumers do not perceive “booking.com” to be generic. The case then was simply about the
proper test for genericity in “generic.com” cases. The USPTO
argued the rule in generic.com cases should follow the rule that
the addition of “Inc.” or “Co.” to generic terms does not create a composite that is not generic. This rule was established in
an 1888 Supreme Court precedent—Goodyear’s India Rubber
Glove Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.3—that held
that a generic term embellished only by the generic designation
of a business entity necessarily produces a generic composite.
In its irst domain name case, which was also the irst case
in which the Court had ever permitted a live audio recording
of oral argument, the Court disagreed. Holding that “[a] term
styled ‘generic.com’ is a generic name for a class of goods
or services only if the term has that meaning to consumers,”
the Court ruled that the USPTO must base its decision on evidence of consumer perception and not on any other rule.4 The
USPTO had argued that the consumer perception inquiry was
unnecessary in this case just as it had been in Goodyear.
Goodbye Goodyear
The Court did not explicitly overrule Goodyear but chose
not to apply it. This case was distinguishable, it reasoned,
because only one entity can occupy a particular domain

Christine Haight Farley is a professor of law at American
University Washington College of Law where she teaches courses
on intellectual property, advertising law, and art law. She can be
reached at cfarley@wcl.american.edu. The author is grateful for the
excellent research assistance provided by Allison Clark.

name. Thus, while there could be several entities calling
themselves “Wine Co.,” there can be only one wine.com. This
distinction is not a logical distinction, but a factual distinction. It presumes that consumers know that under our federal
system, corporate law is governed by state law so that different companies can register the same corporate name in
different states, but under the technical rules of the domain
name system, only one entity may register that name in .com.
This factual distinction is then the basis for an argument that
consumers would perceive a “generic.com” differently than
they would perceive a “Generic Corp.,” but it is not a policy rationale for evading the Court’s previous decision. The
majority, however, resisted the implications of this factual
distinction. If it is signiicant that there can be only one wine.
com, presumably that is because consumers will understand
the exclusivity conveyed by such a designation. It is curious
then that the Court stated that it did “not embrace a rule automatically classifying such terms as nongeneric.”5
The Court supplemented this distinction with an interpretation of Goodyear that clashed with the USPTO’s. The USPTO
understood Goodyear to pronounce a rule that a generic term
supplemented only by a generic corporate designation could
not produce a protectable mark as a matter of law. Characterizing such a rule as “unyielding,” the Court noted that it “entirely
disregards consumer perception,” which the Court stated is a
“bedrock principle of the Lanham Act.”6 Instead, the Court saw
the Goodyear rule as “a more modest principle harmonious
with Congress’ subsequent enactment” of the Lanham Act.7
The Court suggested that a rule “incompatible” with consumer
confusion is therefore incompatible with the Lanham Act.
Booking.com had argued that Goodyear was “repudiated” by
the Lanham Act.8 The Court declined such a pronouncement,
but suggested that any rule that doesn’t yield to consumer perception has been repudiated.
The rule Goodyear announced does not yield to consumer
confusion. Goodyear declared:
[P]arties united to produce or sell wine, or to raise cotton or
grain, might style themselves Wine Company, Cotton Company, or Grain Company; but by such description they would
in no respect impair the equal right of others engaged in similar business to use similar designations . . . . Names of such
articles cannot be adopted as trade-marks . . . ; nor will the
incorporation of a company in the name of an article of commerce, without other speciication, create any exclusive right
to the use of the name.9

The Court thus stated that the adoption of a “Generic Corp.” cannot be an adopted trademark as a matter of law. Had there been
evidence indicating that “Goodyear Rubber Company” was not
understood by consumers as generic, the result would have been
the same. The Court stated that “[t]he designation Goodyear
Rubber Company not being subject to exclusive appropriation”
could be freely employed by others.10 It was a formulation that
was not subject to appropriation regardless of the facts.
The Goodyear Court’s rule is thus incompatible with the
Booking.com rule: “Whether any given ‘generic.com’ term
is generic, we hold, depends on whether consumers in fact
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perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as a term
capable of distinguishing among members of the class.”11 The
Court thus silently overruled Goodyear.
The Customer Is Always Right
Signiicantly, the Court’s broad statement that following
Congress’s enactment of the Lanham Act all rules must be
compatible with consumer perception cites no authority
within Congress’s enactment for such a changed standard.
Indeed, the Lanham Act offers no citable language for this
proposition. In fact, the Lanham Act makes consumer perception subservient to other doctrines, such as the absolute
registration bars (deceptive marks, lags, etc.), and certain
defenses, such as fair use and laches.
Booking.com convinced the Court that the Goodyear rule
was odious. In its briefs and oral argument, the rule was disapprovingly characterized as a “per se” rule, a classiication taken
up by the majority. Booking.com also effectively denigrated
the precedent as being too old. In the oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts twice noted that the Goodyear case was 130 years
old and pointedly asked why we would now focus on it.12 Likewise, Justice Alito, noting that Goodyear was “from a different
era,” asked for a rule “that makes sense in the Internet age.”13
Also echoing Booking.com’s argument, the Court noted its
inconsistent application by the USPTO and stated that its adoption could therefore put issued registrations in peril.
None of this, however, gives the Court license to ignore its
own precedent. Goodyear is far from out of date; it perfectly
captures the issue of claiming trademark rights in domain
names. The rule advanced by the USPTO is an extension of
Goodyear for the internet age. The Court, however, gave itself
license to ignore Goodyear with this statement: “we discern
no support for the [Goodyear rule] in trademark law or policy.”14 Therein lies the importance of this case going forward.
Goodyear is a part of current trademark law, and its rule rests
entirely on trademark policy. The policy it espouses is trademark law’s protection of competition. For the majority, that
policy had no purchase in this case. Harm to competition just
wasn’t tangible. In the void, the Court latched on to consumer
perception as the driver of trademark policy.
Goodyear was concerned with the monopolization of a
generic term by a Generic Co. Meanwhile, the majority in
Booking.com was convinced by Booking.com that attempts
to assert exclusive rights in generic.coms were “losers.”15
Booking.com also promised that if it received a registration, it would not enforce it against similar domains. Both the
majority and dissent referred to this promise and cited it in
the oral argument transcript, presumably to make it binding?
That plus $5 will get a competitor a cup of coffee while it
reads the cease and desist letter it will receive from Booking.
com for using a similar domain. Booking.com also convinced
the majority not only that highly descriptive terms result in
thin trademarks, but also that the doctrine of descriptive fair
use adequately protects competition. If in fact the trademark
offers Booking.com such weak rights, one wonders why it
chose to pay to litigate a registration refusal all the way to the
Supreme Court when it already claims common-law rights in
the designation, holds related registrations in design marks,

holds 85 registrations for Booking.com worldwide (each of
which can be relied on in a domain name dispute), and has
secured the domain name. If all it really wanted was a thin
trademark, it could have more easily achieved that by simply
disclaiming the generic term in a stylized mark.
Justice Breyer, the sole dissenter, was also the sole link to
all of the Court’s precedent protecting competition. Interestingly, Justices Ginsberg and Breyer often found themselves
on opposite sides in intellectual property cases. Breyer saw
the monopoly danger and issued one of his most tight and
convincing opinions.
Goodyear, the USPTO, and Justice Breyer all saw a danger that the majority did not. Just as a company selling wine
should not be able to own a trademark in “wine,” neither
should it be able to do an end run around that prohibition by
adopting the moniker “Wine Co.” To allow a trademark in
such cases, according to Goodyear, would “impair the equal
right of others engaged in similar business to use similar designations, for the obvious reason that all persons have a right
to deal in such articles, and to publish the fact to the world.”16
In sharp contrast, the Booking.com majority concluded that
the USPTO’s concern about granting “undue control over
similar language, i.e., ‘booking,’ that others should remain
free to use . . . attends any descriptive mark,” and “[r]esponsive to it, trademark law hems in the scope of such marks
short of denying trademark protection altogether.”17 The
majority seems not even to ind a policy justiication for the
law’s distinction between generic and descriptive terms. The
equivalent in patent law would be giving up § 101 of the
Patent Act on the assurance that § 102 and § 103 would protect the public domain. Or perhaps Booking.com goes even
further, suggesting that subject matter constraints are unnecessary when effective constraints exist on the scope of rights.
Having Its Cake and Eating the Competition Too
Although the decision was not surprising, it was nonetheless disappointing. In elevating the public policy work that
consumer perception does in trademark law, the Court has
opened the door to monopolizing generic terms, especially
to large companies. Justice Breyer’s dissent was spot on.
In deciding that a generic.com can be registered as a trademark if it has a source-identifying meaning to consumers,
the Supreme Court allows Booking.com to have its cake and
eat it too. In registering www.booking.com, the online booking company monopolized the generic word for its services
in .com, and in adopting the domain name as its business
name, it immediately conveyed to consumers the services
it provides. Other advantages follow, including a conspicuous web presence and—as a result of recent domain name
system rules—the sole right to own the term as its own toplevel domain: .booking. The usual consequence of adopting
a business name that does no more than convey the services
provided is that the name can’t be registered as a trademark; a trade-off many would accept. But the Supreme Court
removed that consequence and cleared the way for Booking.
com to also eat its cake.
Preserving competition is the basis of the trademark rule
against monopolizing generic terms. Booking.com is already one
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of the largest online travel agencies in the world. It is owned by
Booking Holdings Inc., which also owns many of the other booking websites, including Priceline.com, Agoda.com, Kayak.com,
Cheaplights, Rentalcars.com, Momondo, and OpenTable.18 The
company has had antitrust issues in the European Union, U.K.,
and Turkey.19 In the U.S., it already owns the trademark VILLAS.
COM,20 and it purchased the domain and priority rights to BOOKINGS.COM, which now simply redirects to booking.com. In
addition to owning the gTLD .booking, the company also owns
the gTLD .hotels.21 This is not a company that invites competition.
Survey Says: Problems Ahead
The USPTO is on a Supreme Court losing streak in trademark
law. Since 2017, including the instant decision, the USPTO has
lost all three of the cases it appealed to the Court.22 In Booking.
com, one may wonder why the USPTO seemed to have put all
of its eggs into the basket of precedent as it argued only that
the Goodyear rule should apply; it had no alternative argument.
In oral argument, Justices Kagan and Gorsuch both asked the
USPTO for an alternative to the per se rule. By not challenging
the district court’s factual indings, the USPTO seems to have
chosen an all-or-nothing approach.
Anyone who has thought about how generic terms are identiied by the USPTO will understand why this was a necessary
litigation strategy. Goodyear was not just a preferred rule for
the USPTO—it was the only practical rule to prohibit the registration of generic.coms. Under the USPTO proposed rule,
survey evidence is irrelevant. As a result of Booking.com, the
USPTO will now have to contend with survey evidence of
consumer perception in generic.com cases. But what can the
USPTO—in the form of a single examiner—do to counter such
evidence? If a company has the resources to introduce survey
evidence that a generic.com is not perceived by consumers as
generic, the USPTO will not be in the position that a court is
in when genericism is litigated between two parties. It will not
have the beneit of considering counterevidence in the form of
an alternate survey or a survey expert’s critique.
A critical issue going forward will be how to ensure that
the survey evidence indicates proper consumer perception
because not all consumer perception evidence is relevant. The
doctrine of “de facto secondary meaning” holds that once a
designation has been determined to be generic, no amount
of consumer recognition can transform its status into that of
a protected mark. As Judge Friendly, author of the oft-cited
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. decision that
made doctrinal sense of generic terms, stated:
[E]ven proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some
“merely descriptive” marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark. . . . [N]o
matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term
has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and
what success it has achieved in securing public identiication,
it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of
the right to call an article by its name.23

Under this rule, if booking.com was generic when the
domain was irst used, the fact that the owner of that

website has now convinced consumers that the designation
is its brand name is irrelevant.
The inluential McCarthy treatise notes that the danger in
being too accepting of survey evidence would “allow spurious claims of trademark status for generic names based on
shaky and unreliable evidence of customer perception.”24
McCarthy cautions that “[i]f courts were not scrupulous in
weighing the evidence, this could constitute a large loophole
in the classic rule against ownership of generic names,” and
“the way for a court to handle such a case is to consider the
proof of customer perception that the trademark proponent
puts into evidence and to balance it against the public policy
of open competition and free use of generic names.”25 The
work of examiners in evaluating survey evidence in generic
cases is considerable, but their tools are few.
Where a private party seeks to invalidate a mark as generic,
it is better positioned than the USPTO to undermine survey
evidence with conlicting evidence, which may include expert
opinion on survey design and additional surveys. Because
the USPTO can’t hire experts or commission surveys, it cannot effectively guard the public domain in the absence of a per
se rule. What the USPTO can do in lieu of a survey is comb
databases and list the generic uses of the term at issue. But
in the case of a generic.com, there necessarily will be less of
this evidence because competitor use may be nonexistent. For
example, Booking.com’s competitors routinely use “booking,”
but they don’t use “booking.com” because any reference to a
domain name provides consumers with not only the address
of the competition but also a nonstop free shuttle ride to their
place of business. Thus, in evaluating the evidence in the case
of a generic.com, the USPTO must guard against the public
domain with both of its arms tied behind its back.
Defeating De Facto Secondary Meaning
A straightforward method for the USPTO to deal with survey evidence and weed out de facto secondary meaning is
to sort it by the date it was created. Booking.com’s survey
showing 74.8 percent of respondents recognized the domain
name as a brand name was not conducted until 2016, after it
had long used and heavily advertised the mark.26 Indeed, the
company’s briefs and expert reports recount an extraordinary
effort—especially in the ive years prior to the survey—to
create brand awareness.27 So did the 2016 survey measure the
original understanding of booking.com or de facto secondary
meaning? If the latter, the USPTO needs a workable means to
discount—or even ignore—this evidence, such as a rebuttable
presumption that it is evidence of de facto secondary meaning based on its date of creation. For the USPTO to otherwise
simply accept survey evidence would create, in the words of
McCarthy, “a large loophole in the classic rule against ownership of generic names.”
The hypothetical “washingmachine.com” exposes the vulnerability in the majority’s ruling. Invented as a control in
Booking.com’s survey—no washingmachine.com website
or company exists—30 percent of respondents nonetheless
identiied it as a brand.28 But the percent indicates that only a
minority view a domain name as a brand; the majority—60.8
percent—believed washingmachine.com was generic.29 Under
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the majority’s consumer perception rule, these facts indicate
that washingmachine.com is generic.
The key question then is what accounts for the 44.8 percent
difference in brand recognition between washingmachine.com
and booking.com. What other than de facto secondary meaning
can explain these results? If washingmachine.com were operated
by a company that invested an advertising budget comparable
to Booking.com and created a comparable user base, it would
also likely see a 44.8 percent boost in brand recognition. If said
washingmachine.com were allowed to introduce such survey
evidence, it would thereby be enabled to overcome its generic
designation with de facto secondary meaning.
The majority didn’t attend to this vulnerability likely
because it assumed that booking.com was not generic when
irst used based on its belief that consumers think domains necessarily indicate single entities. That assumption, however, is
undermined by the washingmachine.com survey results that
60.8 percent thought it was generic. The majority’s assumption
was supported to some extent—30 percent thought it was a
brand for no apparent reason. These respondents were presumably reacting to the .com sufix since 100 percent of the survey
respondents identiied “supermarket” as generic. Still, the
majority’s assumption is belied by the majority of respondents.
The majority’s assumption that generic.coms are understood as indicating a single entity may also be based on the
belief that consumers would never utter a generic.com except
to refer to a single entity. In oral argument, Chief Justice
Roberts observed that “nobody refers to [travel booking sites]
as Booking.coms,”30 and the majority similarly observed that
a consumer would never “ask a frequent traveler to name
her favorite ‘Booking.com.’”31 And yet, Booking.com’s own
lawyer demonstrated in oral arguments just how a consumer
would do this unthinkable act when stating, “I have searched
every grocerystore.com looking for toilet paper. I have now
started looking at every hardware.com.”32
This reliance on assumed consumer understanding of
generic.coms is yet another example of the contrasting viewpoints between the Booking.com Court and the Goodyear
Court. Under Booking.com’s reasoning, “Wine Corp.” can be
registered because there is no genus of goods that consumers commonly refer to as “wine corp.” The Goodyear Court
was not focused on consumer use, but instead loopholes in
the generic prohibition. Its rule effectively prevented a wine
seller who couldn’t register “wine” from registering “Wine
Co.” because of its interest in protecting competition regardless of consumer understanding.
When You Know Who’s Going to Win at Monopoly
but You Have to Keep Playing
The policy question at the heart of this case is whether the
prohibition on registering generic terms is worth it. If it is, it
should be worth not creating a loophole that you could sail a
cruise ship through. If it is, it should be worth tolerating the
inlexibility of a per se rule. If it is, it should even be worth
ignoring current consumer perception.
With its Booking.com decision, not only did the Supreme
Court effectively overrule one of its own precedents, but
it also reversed the established rule that generic.coms are
®

unprotectable. Both the dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit
decision and the McCarthy treatise state that the USPTO’s per
se rule was the accepted position.33 These reversals have now
made generic.coms much more valuable than they already
were.34 The heretofore unexpected trademark rights that can
now low from a generic.com will create a renewed market
interest in these domains. The irony is that the newly minted
top-level domains, such as .car, .travel, and .holiday, have been
made available as a means of escaping the hold of .com.35 This
decision will enhance the magnetic force of .com.
Generic.coms present an even greater risk of monopoly powers than a Generic Corp. does. As the dissent in the
Fourth Circuit correctly stated, “[t]his case addresses a problem that Booking.com chose to bring upon itself.”36 The
adoption of a generic term as a trademark always involves a
problem of the applicant’s own creation. Now, however, in
the case of a generic.com, the applicant gets to have it both
ways without having to make the usual trade-off between
trademark rights and instant communication of the business
offerings. Whereas the doctrine of trademark genericity follows the saying that you can’t have your cake and eat it too,
the Booking.com rule allows a generic.com that purchases a
pricey cake to grab the key to the bakery. n
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